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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift jür wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS.

Naives und wissenschaftliches Weltbild. VITALIS NORSTRÖM. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XIII, 4, pp. 491–510.

The purpose of the present article is to direct attention to the discrepancy existing between the realm of science and the world of common sense, and to discuss in a general way the relation between the two. Is one justified in saying that the world of science is the real world, while the realm of immediate experience is mere appearance? This question states the problem of the article, and the logical drift of the discussion is towards a negative answer. Nature cannot be conceived as the original of which science is a copy. On the contrary, there is a quite evident disparity between the truth of science and the concrete data, so-called, of sense-perception; for science finds its truth, not in actuality, but in universal validity. Still the opposition is not complete. After all, science is only the result of the subject's reaction to the actual from a specific standpoint determined by definite interests. Thus actuality and knowledge find their synthesis in the one subject of which both are possessions. Science is not the whole truth, but a method of dealing with the given aspect of experience; the experience of the subject is the ultimate synthesis, and includes within itself both actuality and knowledge. The author promises further to develop this position in a later article.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Entwickelungslehre: Entwurf einer neuen Weltanschauung. OSCAR LJUNGSTRÖM. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XIII, 4, pp. 474–490.

As the title indicates, this article is an attempt on the part of the author to state in outline a new theory of development. He criticises the theory of spontaneity, *i. e.*, the theory which teaches that the higher types are produced by the lower; and in opposition to this he calls his own view the 'Rezipierungstheorie,' understanding by the term 'Rezipierung' the influence exerted by the higher factor in the process upon the lower. Thus, in general terms, one might say that the theory amounts to an insistence that the lower stages of development find their explanation by reference to the higher and not *vice versa.* The article is divided into two general parts, entitled respectively 'Epistemological Presuppositions' and 'The Kingdoms (*Reiche*) of Nature.' In the first part, the author summarizes the forces or the principles of development as he calls them, which manifest themselves at the various stages in the evolutionary process; the highest of these he conceives to be the capacity for thought. In the second part, the traditional division of nature into the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms is discarded. Corresponding to the principles of development active at the various stages, there are found to be seven 'realms' of natural evolution. They are the realms of motion, of attraction, of insensible forms (*das Kristallreich*), of plants, of animals, of man, and, finally, the Kingdom of God, where the principle of free thought which is active in man reaches its consummation.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

L'ordre des sciences. F. LE DANTEC. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 7, pp. 1–21; 9, pp. 248–271.

The life of man is comparable to the voyage of a vessel. As the latter, formerly based on the personal and particular records of the 'log,' now depends on the observations made by means of impersonal and accurate instruments of measurement, so the former, leaving behind the conflicting dictates of tradition, rests on universally valid science. Whether the principles of science are absolutely binding or, on the contrary, are mere postulates, is the question here proposed for philosophical consideration. With the beginning of articulate speech, science had its genesis. Language, as a storehouse of tradition, has been a mighty power in the development of scientific principles; but, obviously, the speech of everyday life is hardly definite and impersonal enough to afford the accuracy and the possibility of universal interpretation so essential to scientific procedure. As man's first recognition of the world is disparate, — *i. e.*, as a mass of colors, tastes, odors, sounds, extensions, etc., — so must be the expression of his conception of the world. Each sense-organ makes its peculiar appeal; each phenomenon will be differently perceived and conceived by different individuals. The impersonality and universality necessary to scientific observation is lacking. The difficulty is overcome, however, by reducing the findings of the divers sense-organs to a common scale, that of extension, recorded in a generally understood language, that of mathematics. Every modification of color, taste, sound, etc., is concomitant with a change in extension. Mathematics is based on this variation of extension; so all sensible phenomena find expression in mathematical language through the intervention of extension. Observation of variation is by means of movement on graduated scales of measurement; vision, then, is all-important in measuring variation. The foundation of scientific work is the assumption of a universal mechanism, impersonal and non-specific. This is the basis of the theory of the conservation of energy. And here arises a philosophical consideration: Energy, as it is exactly and universally conserved, must be an absolute entity; yet, if the theory is to be of general use in science, man must be conceived as cognizant of all transformations in which energy is implicated. Hence energy is either postulated merely for practical use and convenience in science, or man has full knowledge of an absolute entity. The latter alternative is obviously absurd; the former needs further investigation. Energy, etymologically, means 'capacity for work.' The notion of energy precedes mathematical formulation in the psychological conception of effort. Changes in inert masses are referred to agents (forces) capable of producing them, and we have the dualism of the active self and passive non-self that is further developed in the principle of inertia of matter. This principle holds that 'a body cannot, of itself, change its state of motion or of rest'; and further that, 'without the action of forces, the inertia of a moving body is maintained in uniform and rectilinear motion.' This latter formulation must be a conventional postulate, for such motion is inconceivable except ideally. Even with reference to the inertia of the quiescent body, the principle falls short, in that it tacitly omits the ever-present force of gravitation in its statement. Again, when we turn to the measurement of energy, further conventional conceptions are unearthed. Energy is measured as the product of the mass of the inert body into the acceleration which alone manifests the action of the force. But note the arbitrary features involved in the notion of force. The straight line, purely on account of popular prejudice, creeps in as a necessary adjunct to the notion of force, — *cf.* the resolution of concurring forces. Very manifestly, force is but a mathematical convenience, a conception based on the psychological notion of effort, and not an absolute entity. Now examine anew the theory of the conservation of energy, built up on the conventional foundation above considered. Shall we condemn it because of these arbitrary elements? No, not any more than we condemn science in general because of its traditional basis, or look askance on the compass and sextant because they have evolved from the ship's 'log.' Conservation of energy, regarded on the side of inertia as the equilibrium of action and reaction, exhibits the universal interrelation of phenomena, the eternal underlying unity of the world. Energy, in its exact conservation, furnishes the constant, the impersonal fixed point of reference, that true science must have in the world of change.

R. Y. HOFFMAN.

The Doctrine of the Eject. GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 19, pp. 505–510; 21, pp. 561–567; 23, pp. 617–623.

Solipsism is an unnatural doctrine; plain men and philosophers alike reject it. The real question is, How do we know the existence of other minds? The common sense doctrine of the eject holds that it is only through analogy, and this view psychology endorses. It is objected that the child accepts the existence of other minds before it is conscious of the inference. The fact that it associates pleasure or pain with material things other than its own body does not mean, however, that it has a direct knowledge of another's pleasure or pain; it may not have even an indirect knowledge of such states. We do not find immediate knowledge of other minds in early mental life; the distinction between the thoughts of the self and of others is a gradual growth, which finally becomes clear through inference. Taylor objects, in his *Elements of Metaphysics*, that one term of the analogy, knowledge of one's own physical structure, is absent. It may be answered that men draw the inference from what they know of themselves, not from what they do not know. Though Taylor holds in general that we know other minds immediately, he is frequently compelled to abandon this theory and accept the doctrine of analogy. Strong, in *Why the Mind Has a Body*, holds that the argument from analogy is imperfect, for it cannot be verified as can the inductive argument in physical science. But neither can the doubt be verified. Moreover, an inference in physical science, so long as it remains an inference, is only verifiable, not verified. Our inferences may be rational, though not the same as the inductive inference. Strong holds, however, that instinct furnishes a basis for the inference and so supplements the analogy. If he means by this that instinct assures us that other minds exist, it is disproved by the fact that where the analogy fades out our inferences fall away; if he means that instinct tells us that the argument from analogy is valid, it may be objected that the word 'instinct' cannot properly be used in this way. Though this paper has presented the view that two consciousnesses are always mutually ejective; yet, as in the individual's knowledge of his own past life, what has been known as eject may become known as object, so in numerous cases the existence of other consciousnesses seems to be directly verifiable.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The New Realism. JOHN E. BOODIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., IV, 20, pp. 533–542.

Realism maintains the existence of reals beyond the apperceptive unity of individual consciousness. These reals can make a difference to that consciousness so as to be known. Idealism must hold that there is only one unity of consciousness, and that, therefore, the relation to reality is a perspicuous relation. The fallacy that only like can act upon like has been assumed by metaphysical idealism and materialism alike. The merit of idealism is that it has shown that the universe must be differentiated with reference to our purposive attitudes; its weakness lies in its attempt to reduce nature to reflective experience. Materialism has been right in applying mechanical categories to part of reality, but dogmatic in applying them to institutional reality as well. A second fallacy is the assumption that what is not stuff cannot be real.. But real objects are never constituted by sense-perception; they must be known through our purposive attitudes, or conceptual constructions. 'Possible' perception must be invoked to complete the empirical idealist's reality; and 'possible' is not a category of perception. The author does not maintain, however, that reality must be conceptual, but that it is only 'really' knowable in so far as it is conceptual. The reals beyond our consciousness are objects of thought or purposive will, not of sense. Perceptual qualities have no reality except as relations to conscious energetic centres or purposive wills. They cannot interact, as they are the functional connections of energetic centres when a conscious will is part of the complex. The noumenal world must be differentiated according to our purpose into stuff and non-stuff. Stuff can be graded into types which we can acknowledge as purposive in their own right, and those which we acknowledge as existing, but whose inwardness escapes us. The former constitute the realm of idealism, the latter of materialism. Our conceptual structures should be regarded as copies or as tools with reference to the larger world, according as we make reality that of other purposive structures, or infra-reflective. Since the author acknowledges different kinds and grades of energetic centres, his theory, as regards the stuff character of reality, is pluralistic. The theory also insists upon non-stuff dimensions of reality, which also are noumena, differing from stuff types in that they are perceptually continuous with our psychophysical organism. They cannot appear as phenomena, but must be acknowledged for the realization of our purposes.

F. A. PEEK.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Das Gesetz von der Erhaltung der Energie und die Annahme einer Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Seele. ERICH BECHER. Z. f. Psych., XLV, 2, pp. 81–122.

The law of the conservation of energy is now so generally recognized as a well-working hypothesis that the upholders of the theory of interaction are trying to reconcile their view concerning the relation of mind and body with this hypothesis. This reconciliation has taken on three forms. The first is represented by H. Schwarz and especially L. Busse, who with Wundt differentiates the law of the conservation of energy into the principle of equivalence and the principle of constancy. The latter presupposes that the universe is a closed mechanical system, which the interactionists are not willing to grant. Busse maintains that the former principle holds true only in purely mechanical events and cannot be applied where psychical causes and effects are involved. To this Becher emphatically objects and quotes the investigations of Lavoisier and Laplace, of Despretz and Dulong, of Gavarret, and in particular those of M. Rubner on "The Sources of Animal Heat" and of W. O. Atwater on the same topic with regard to man. Their results have established beyond all doubt the fact of the conservation of energy in animal and human organisms. The second kind of reconciliation assumes, besides the physical energy, a sort of psychical energy, and maintains that the law of the conservation of energy holds true for the sum of both together. Such a view is taken by v. Grot, Ostwald, and Külpe, while Stumpf, Erhart, and perhaps Ladd hold it plausible. Now the law of the conservation of energy resulted from a purely mechanical conception of the universe, and hence the attempt to subsume the psychical events under the term energy comes dangerously close to materialism. Busse's objections to this kind of interactionism are not weighty enough for our author. Becher's own arguments against the assumption of a psychical energy are based upon Atwater's calorimetrical investigations, which have shown that the physical energy supplied to and given out by a human organism remains always in a state of equilibrium. Now if there were a psychical energy which was constantly changing into or arising from physical energy, we should have to assume that there is always as much physical energy absorbed into psychical energy as there is psychical energy changing back into physical energy. Besides, these mutual transformations must be of such short duration and so well balanced as to be beyond human observation. But such assumptions are too artificial and improbable to deserve serious consideration. The third method of reconciliation emphasizes the fact that the law of the conservation of energy does not at all determine unequivocally the temporal course of a physical event, but must be crossed by other natural laws whose validity for brain processes has not been proved. Hence there is a possibility in the case of psychical events that the mind takes their place, and, in coöperation with the law of the conservation of energy, determines the course of our mental life. But then the interactionist must confine the mind's influence to certain limiting cases only, and cannot give any satisfactory explanation of such accidental or fortuitous selections. However, this last form of the interaction theory, which assumes that any cause may have a double effect, a physical and a psychical one, and that any effect may similarly have a double cause, is perhaps most closely related to the theory of psychophysical parallelism. The author finally discusses a hypothesis which views the influence of the mind on the body as a kind of process of releasing (Auslösungsprozess) and which is held by Rehmke and Wentscher. Such a view cannot be brought into harmony with the law of the conservation of energy. Supposing a certain system of relatively high potential energy to be in a state of unstable equilibrium, then a relatively small addition of new energy would destroy the equilibrium and change some of the potential energy into kinetic energy. Now if mental life consists in the releasing of kinetic energy, then this must be due in the last analysis to an addition of some new energy whose origin cannot be accounted for. Attempts to avoid this conclusion lead to fortuitous artificialities similar to those mentioned above. Hence, as the final result of this critical review of the interactionist hypotheses, our author reaches the conclusion that the law of the conservation of energy is in harmony only with the theory of psychophysical parallelism.

L. R. GEISSLER.

ETHICS.

Determinismus in der Erziehung. ERNST VOWINCKEL. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XIII, 4, pp. 429–456.

Among the many principles of education and the manifold forms of the practical application of these principles, two theories with their attendant methods are especially prominent. The one is an ethical theory of free will based upon theological considerations ; the other is a kind of æsthetic theory, which maintains determined development and justifies its claims by the principles and from the standpoint of the natural sciences. The aim of the present article is to exhibit the inadequacy of these two theories as pedagogical principles, and to establish a mediating type of theory between them. The theological-ethical theory logically leads to nothing new in education, its end being the attempted justification of a revered tradition to which initiative is subordinated. The scientific-æsthetic theory also destroys initiative by making of man a machine-like automaton, and it logically leads towards a complete neglect of history and its lessons. Both theories equally deny freedom, which forever remains an insoluble problem from the one-sided standpoint of either Determinism or Indeterminism. Both series leave no room for the appearance in the process of development of that most significant and unique somewhat called the mystery of personality. And it is upon this conception of personality that the true type of educational theory must be founded; for the aim and goal of education is the formation of personality. The last few pages of the article the author devotes to a discussion of the structure of the type of theory whose starting-point is this presupposition.

G. W. CUNNINGHAM.

Morale et raison. D. PARODI. Rev. Ph., XXXII, 10, pp. 383–411.

Contemporary sociology is inclined to reduce ethics to a science of customs. It condemns utilitarian and metaphysical ethics alike as purely arbitrary, and considers itself alone as capable of establishing morality on a positive basis. Yet is there a real contradiction between positivism and rationalism in matters of conduct? The *Études de morale positive,* by Gustave Belot, is an important contribution to the subject, aiming to present an ethical view-point which would combine realism and rationalism, without the sacrifice of either. Belot regards metaphysics as powerless before the problem of morality, and holds that Kant had a right to base a general logic of action upon his Critique of Practical Reason, but not an ethical system. Science has not succeeded any better in dealing with the problem alone; the purely sociological view of morality is open to criticism even more than the purely metaphysical view. From its standpoint, ethics becomes a mere science of customs. But society is not of a fixed nature, capable of being treated thus. Such a science of customs would become the more useless, the more it was perfected. Ethics cannot be reduced to a mere technique: one has not only to discover morality, but also, as it were, to invent it. Belot regards the idea of a science of ends as nonsensical; the ultimate cannot be demonstrated, he argues with Aristotle. The task of ethics is not to assign an arbitrary goal of human conduct; morality does not consist in passive obedience to an external rule of conduct, but in the intelligent acceptance of principles arising from the collective social will. Thus is achieved the union between rationality, which defines the form of morality, and sociality, which defines its content. Positive ethics is thus rational in that it is acceptable to the individual conscience; it is also real, since it coincides with the conclusions of inductive sociology. This standpoint is much more Kantian than Belot thinks. Rules of conduct are presented on the principle of general utility; but they are advocated not, as in the case of Utilitarianism, for the sake of any particular social goal, but because it is *rational* to realize the common means to all the desirable social ends. The one absolute duty consists in one's wish to do one's duty; hence ethics is not a science, but a method. Belot's chief objection to rationalistic ethics is that rationality by itself cannot define the content of morality; it does not go beyond showing the necessity of consistency in one's acts and decisions. But a mere rational coherence is not sufficient as a test of morality. The writer, on the other hand, cannot conceive of acts that are rationally consistent and yet immoral or non-moral. For him the completely rational is *ipso facto* moral. Reason ultimately remains the supreme judge in matters of morality. At times Belot is liable to confuse morality with the practical code of moral customs, a confusion identical with that of the sociological ethics which he is combatting; for ethics is first of all a criticism whereby honest man rationally seeks to justify the acceptance of a system of socially useful conduct. The two elements in Belot's ethics which at first sight seem to make his position dualistic, are really two aspects of the same standpoint. Objectively, morality is the observance of certain rules of conduct, without which social life and civilization, and with these conscience and reason, would be impossible. Subjectively, morality is the ensemble of principles which reason accepts in its rational justification of its own consistency of action.

R. A. TSANOFF.

On Certain Alleged Defects in the Christian Morality. JAMES SETH. The Hibbert Journal, VI, 1, pp. 101–117.

The Christian ideal has lately been subjected to unsparing criticism by a so-called 'healthy-minded Paganism.' This criticism falls under three heads: (1) The morality of Christianity is merely negative and ascetic; (2) it is inimical to progress, as its aim is to do away with the struggle of the strong with the weak, and the consequent victory of the fit over the unfit; (3) it is essentially anarchistic and anti-political, as its fundamental principle of the non-resistance of evil implies the dissolution of the state. The author replies to these criticisms that the morality thus attacked is not Christian morality. In the first place, true Christian asceticism does not regard earthly goods as evil; it insists only that they must be subordinated to righteousness as the only absolute good. Christ is so preoccupied with the problem of righteousness that he ignores the other problems of human life; but this is not to deny that they exist and must be solved. And we must admit that spiritual well-being is the supreme end of life. Moreover, even were there any of this supposed tendency to asceticism in the Christian ideal, it would be corrected by the altruism, and consequent practicalism, of that ideal. As to the second objection, which is that of Nietzsche's 'slave-morality,' the answer is that, while the Christian ideal is certainly democratic, breaking down the distinction between the many and the few, it is just for this reason aristocratic in the true sense. It sees in all the possibilities which the best Pagan insight discovered only in the few. Physiological fitness is not equivalent to ethical fitness; nor has Christian virtue been lacking in virile and heroic qualities. Coming to the third objection, it cannot be questioned that Christ intended to substitute a new humanitarianism for the older exclusive patriotism. But this subordination of the political to the ethical point of view does not imply the invalidating of the former. Born in a petty state, preoccupied with a supreme problem, he may have failed to realize the ethical importance of the State, but he did not oppose it. As to the precept of non-resistance, three things should be noticed: first, it was given as a principle, not a rule, of conduct; secondly, its obvious application is not to the public, but to the private life of the individual; and finally, that Christ is here describing the ideal life, and legislating for it. In conclusion, it is pointed out that all these criticisms rest upon the same fundamental misunderstanding of the ethical teaching of Jesus. They all regard it as a code of rules. But Christ enunciated principles rather than rules; it is Christianity as a spirit and a point of view with which we must come to terms if we would rightly appreciate its ethical significance. Christian morality is the fulfilment, rather than the negation, of Pagan morality, a truth too often denied, both by its defenders and by its critics. E. H. HOLLANDS.

Has Sociology a Moral Basis? F. CARREL. Int. J. E., XVII, 4, pp. 448–454.

If sociology has a moral purpose, it is a branch of morals. It has such a purpose, as is shown, *e. g.*, by eugenics, which seeks to create a new moral sanction. Moreover, morals all through history have evolved new forms. Sociology cannot be the foundation of ethics, for the latter came first. As society became more complex, ethics remained concerned primarily with the relation of man to man, while sociology branched off to consider the relation of man to the group. The fineness of the distinction shows that the two are one; or, if they are two, ethics includes social ethics, and sociology is merely statistical. Thus what we call sociology is a bipartite science, one part a branch of morals, the other independent; and it is vain to attempt to substitute it for morals in general.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

The Social Ideal. I. W. HOWERTH. Int. J. E., XVIII, 2, pp. 205-220.

The construction or projection of a social ideal is not a matter of foreseeing the course of the unconscious evolution of society. The ideals of society hitherto constructed have been too largely the work of the imagination. What we need is an ideal scientifically conceived in harmony with existing facts and forces, and hence possible of attainment. There are three constituent elements of the highest realizable ideal of human life : social intelligence, social economy, voluntary coöperation. According to Henry George, social intelligence is that consensus of individual intelligence which forms a public opinion, a public consciousness, and a public will, and is manifested in law, institutions, and administration. Social intelligence, notwithstanding its present rudimentary condition, is the primary element in a rational social ideal. The formation of this intelligence is not only natural, but artificial as well. If the ideal were already realized, social activities would exemplify the law of the economy of force. This raises the question as to what is properly a social task. There is a limit beyond which social organization may not go without defeating its own purpose. In attempting to determine the ideal form or method of social organization, four methods suggest themselves: government by an autocrat, by the state (in the restricted sense), by private individuals acting in their own interests, by society itself. The first method must be dismissed, since an ideal leader, or a succession of such leaders, could not be secured, and the people in any case would be deprived of the greatest opportunities of self-development. Similar objections could be made to the second and third methods. In democracy, however, the ideal becomes progressively realized as intelligence and economy approach perfection. In this organization, coöperation for the public good must become both conscious and voluntary. The good of each, while subordinate to, is yet realized in, the good of all. Whatever tends to increase popular participation in government is, so far, justified in principle.

F. A. PEEK.